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Peter Coroneos on ISP mandatory filtering PDF Print
Tuesday, 11 May 2010 13:16

Peter Coroneos extended interview with 4 Corners on ABC-TVTranscript of Peter Coroneos, Chief Executive, Internet Industry Association, ABC-TV 4 Corners extended interview with Quentin McDermott

Q: What is the Internet Industry Association and who do you represent?

We’re the national industry body for internet business in Australia.  We have a very broad based membership including internet Service providers but also content publishers and other businesses that facilitate internet commerce in Australia.  We’ve got the large search providers. We’ve got the large content hosting providers and the social media and the new social networking platforms. 

Q: Do you support the government’s proposals for mandatory filter? 

I think firstly we should say that we support a lot of what the government is doing in terms of child safety and family protection. They have a credible record in terms of education and outreach and support for law enforcement.  All of those measures are necessary and should be in place. 

It’s only really in the area of mandatory filtering that we take issue and it’s that component of the policy, if you like, which we think really ought be abandoned in favour of much more effective approaches. 

Q: Why do you oppose it?

For a number of reasons, the first is that we think that in terms of the way that the model is constructed, that it is not going to pick up the kind of content that people really do have issues with online. The volume of content that it is likely to pick up by virtue of the design of the filtering systems is really a drop in the ocean compared to the unsuitable content that is on the internet. And so the fear is that we will be creating a system where people believe that they are safer online, whereas in fact it will only be that content that people complain to the regulator about that is classified, combined perhaps with international input onto lists - but only a few thousand sites at best. 

In other words the best you could say about the filter is that it will prevent inadvertent, accidental, access to a very limited number of sites, in the absence of any evidence whether anecdotal or empirical the people are accidentally coming across child pornography, bestiality, rape sites - the kind of sites that the government is seeking to dramatise here.  Not in our experience, people are routinely bumping into. 

A lot of the content that families really are concerned about for their children - things like violent material, racial hatred material, material which promotes race hate, maybe even just adult content that you wouldn't want your children to see, none of that will be picked up by this filtering solution.

Q: How many websites can these filters block? 

Well in fact the relevant measure they are talking about here is not in relation to entire websites in terms of URLs that is the Universal Resource Locator, which can tag to a specific image on the internet. 

It is actually 10,000 items of content not 10,000 websites which, in the schemes of things is infinitesimal -out of one trillion web pages, 10,000 URLs is obviously a very very tiny number.

Q: And your saying that is the physical technical capacity, it simply can’t filter any more? 

By the Government’s own studies that is the upper end, limitation on this filtering technology. Now typically filtering that is occurring on a voluntary basis in other jurisdictions particularly in Scandinavia and Europe is picking up around 1200 URLs and that’s just child abuse materials. 

So even there, we are taking about very small range of content compared to the vastness of the internet.

Q: Some of the harshest critics of the Government have compared this measure with measures carried out by more totalitarian regimes is that really fair? 

Well yes and no, I mean clearly the Government’s motivation is nothing like the motivation of jurisdictions like Iran and Saudi Arabia and China. 

But unfortunately, the mechanism that they are seeking to employ is indistinguishable from those regimes to the extent that we have a government controlled list that will be encrypted sent through to network providers and then required to have be filtered.  That, in no way, differs from the worst of the worst regimes, regimes that we wouldn’t normally want to be associated with. 

So that really is the concern since the mechanics are indistinguishable.

Secondly of course the absence of constitutionally protected safe guards around access to information, as other jurisdictions do have, there is no capacity for the government to limit future expansion of the scheme.  So even though they say quite clearly, at this point, that they are only interested in restricting it to refused classification content, the fact is under our system no parliament can bind any future parliament. So once the mechanics are installed it would be a relatively simple matter based on the issues of the day for the filters to be expanded over time. 

Q: Are you content that the process is sufficiently transparent? 

This is something that the Government is addressing.  And they have quite a few submissions that they are working through now to address this transparency question. But again, the conundrum is that if are to make a system effective so that the kind of content is not being promoted publicly on the net, necessarily the list needs to be secret.

But if the list is secret then necessarily, it cannot be transparent. 

Although we can put in place ex post facto judicial processes or quasi judicial processes certainly, for scrutiny and reporting to parliament are all measures that, no doubt, the Government will be promoting as a counterbalance to this question. 

But the fundamental issue of the secrecy of the list remains a central component of the scheme as it must do, we acknowledge that it must be that way.

Q: If those lists are made public how easy will the filter be to bypass? 

You don’t even need access to those lists in order to bypass the filter. This is another problem with the situation. And really it is a central concern in that if the intent of the policy is to prevent inadvertent, accidental access to this kind of content well the people who really want to get to this content will still be able to get to it so in effect the harm that you are trying to address for a policy like this is effectively negated by the design of the policy itself. 

Q: In your view why is the government doing this?  Is it just a political gesture?

It really is hard to avoid the conclusion in the face of evidence that shows the inherent limitations in this policy and the outcomes it delivers.  It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that there is some other objective here beyond the protection of Australian families.

Now that is obviously a question for the government to answer. But you’ve got any number of technical experts that have already come out and said ‘this simply won’t work’. 

We need to understand why therefore the government is to push forward with a policy where there is so much doubt around its efficacy. 

Q: Just so I’m clear on this, there are other western democracies of course that filter out content and in most cases I understand it’s solely child pornography.  There is for example New Zealand, United Kingdom, there are other countries.  Are you in favour of those kinds of measures? 

Look, the difference there is these are occurring under voluntary schemes,  where internet service providers themselves are saying ‘we don’t think it’s appropriate for this content to be transiting our network.  We will take whatever internal steps we can manage to do that on behalf of the users.’ 

But unfortunately in Australia we have never been given that opportunity.  We’ve actually approached the government on several occasions to propose a solution that would be consistent with best practice in other jurisdictions.   But, for whatever reason, the Government is intent on pursuing a legislative course here.

Q: What does it do for Australia’s reputation overseas? 

Well, unfortunately through a succession of policies not just limited to this government the internet is more regulated here than other jurisdictions.  That does have a flow on effect in terms of Australia as an investment destination as a destination where innovation can occur, in terms of where large hosting providers are choosing to host their content. 

In all of these areas, Australia is seen as a less friendly destination than other jurisdictions.  And I think that does have a flow on effect in terms of how we are perceived as a digital economy and certainly from the standpoint of our Association.    

Q: Will the Government’s filter deal with the dangers of peer-to-peer file sharing and chat rooms?  

Not at all. And this is one of shortcomings of providing what is effective in their one-size-fits all approach to internet filtering. 

Unlike, the filters you would install on a home computer or even a filter you would install within an office network, where you may well have legitimate reasons for people not to access services online. 

The government’s plan will not do anything to address these measures and problems. Therefore you are left with businesses and home users, still having to go and install their own filtering systems if they want to provide a decent level of protection for the users of those services.

[From the 4 corners program] Let's take the water system as an analogy.

If there are impurities in the water system, the question is where is it best to locate the filter? A lot of taps in kitchens these days have got filters fitted and they're fine filters and they will pick up fine particulate matter.

To put the same fine filter at the head end of the water supply would obviously filter the entire system but it would also dramatically slow the system. So if you want to provide a solution that really is going to be granular in its control in terms of the range of content that parents could determine they don't want their children to see, that is far better done at the user end.

Q: Is the government investing on home-based PC filters?

No, they are not.  In fact this is part of the issue here.  It was part of the policy of the previous Government. And I think the nature of politics is such that parties are always trying to differentiate themselves from their predecessors.   So to some degree, this is doing something different to solve the same problem, but in a way that is not going to deliver us a great solution.  

Q: How will the government deal with high volume sites, like YouTube and Facebook?

Well, I think the government has now acknowledged that high volume sites can’t be part of this regime.  They can’t be subject to filtering in this way because you see, even a single entry from a high volume site, may cause a block of the entire high volume site to all users.  

In Australia, for example we have eight million users on Facebook now.  So you can imagine what would occur, if a single item of content was reported and blocked with the potential to limit access to the entire medium or platform.  The Government is acknowledging now reluctantly, but I think they are forced to acknowledge that these large volume sites cannot be subject to regime. 

Instead they are seeking to negotiate directly with these high volume sites. But the problem they face is with the content they are hosting within the refused classification range of material. 

Subject to which this policy will apply RC is not illegal in jurisdictions in which many of these companies operate.  So if they are hosting content in America (say) on YouTube, news reporting on violence, demonstrations in a way that could potentially fall within our definition of refused classification is actually legal for these companies to host in America. 
  
Q: Now the trials as I understand it have been conducted at relatively low speeds.  What will happen when the National Broadband Network comes in? 

We don’t know, I think that’s a question that nobody can answer. 

Q: Is that a concern?

Well I think it has to be.  I mean this country is investing in the biggest infrastructure project of its kind.  We applaud the government for that. It is a fantastic commitment and a fantastic evolution in the way in which we access the net. 

What we don’t know is by putting filters at the server level, potentially expanded over time to include ever increasing categories of content what impact that we actually have on a $43 billion dollar investment.     

Last Updated on Tuesday, 11 May 2010 14:44
 

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